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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Frederick F. Keller sued his former employer, ORIX Credit 
Alliance, Inc., in federal district court, asserting claims 
under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. S 621 et seq., and the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. S 10:5-1 et seq. 
Keller, who had served as executive vice president and a 
member of the board of directors, claimed that ORIX Credit 
Alliance had discriminated against him based on his age 
when it failed to promote him to the position of chief 
operating officer and later terminated his employment. The 
district court granted summary judgment for ORIX Credit 
Alliance. A panel of this court issued a decision reversing 
the district court, but ORIX Credit Alliance's petition for 
rehearing en banc was granted, and we now affirm. 
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I. 
 
A. 
 
Background of the Parties and the Dispute. ORIX Credit 
Alliance is a subsidiary of companies that are in turn 
subsidiaries of ORIX Corporation, a Japanese company. 
App. 385-86, 616. ORIX Credit Alliance is a commercial 
finance company that is engaged primarily in the business 
of financing the acquisition or leasing of equipment. Id. at 
310. ORIX Credit Alliance generally must borrow the funds 
needed to support the financing it provides for its 
customers. Id. In simple terms, the company makes a profit 
by borrowing funds at one rate and then lending to its 
customers a higher rate. Id. at 80. 
 
Frederick Keller was born on January 31, 1942. App. 
610. After college, he was hired by Franklin National Bank 
and eventually handled its relationship with Credit Alliance 
Corporation, ORIX Credit Alliance's predecessor. Id. at 611. 
In 1976, Credit Alliance Corporation hired Keller as a vice 
president, and in that capacity he shared the primary 
responsibility for raising funds for the company. Id. at 612, 
1121. Keller obtained funding from banks, helped to 
supervise "the commercial paper program," and worked on 
"other sources of funding." Id. at 1120-21. The then- 
chairman of the company has described Keller's work as 
"excellent," and after several years, Keller was promoted to 
senior vice president of finance. Id. at 614. 
 
In December 1984, First Interstate Bancorp acquired 
Credit Alliance Corporation's parent company, and Credit 
Alliance Corporation continued to do business as First 
Interstate Credit Alliance Corp. App. 613. After this 
acquisition, First Interstate Bancorp provided most of the 
funding used by First Interstate Credit Alliance Corp. for its 
lending activities, and therefore it was no longer necessary 
for Keller to raise money. Id. at 614. Keller acquired the 
titles of executive vice president, chief financial officer, and 
chief credit officer, and he served as a member of the 
company's board of directors. Id. 70-71, 1121. In 1988, the 
chairman of the board of First Interstate Credit Alliance 
Corp. told Keller that he had been considered for the 
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presidency of the company but that Daniel Ryan had been 
selected. Id. at 1121. 
 
In September 1989, ORIX subsidiaries acquired First 
Interstate Credit Alliance Corp., which continued to do 
business under the name of ORIX Credit Alliance. App. at 
616. Prior to the acquisition, Keller and six other key 
executives were requested to sign employment contracts 
with the new company, and Keller signed a three-year 
contract for employment at a substantial annual salary. Id. 
at 616, 644. 
 
After this acquisition, Keller was given the responsibility 
for raising funding for ORIX Credit Alliance. App. 78. At 
that time, according to Keller's affidavit, "Credit Alliance 
had approximately 1.6 billion in debt outstanding to First 
Interstate Bancorp, 1.3 billion of which was to continue to 
be provided on a temporary basis. Because it was the goal 
of Credit Alliance to obtain funding independent of First 
Interstate Bancorp and of ORIX Corp. or ORIX USA[an 
ORIX subsidiary] [Keller] determined that it would ultimately 
be necessary for Credit Alliance to have available credit 
facilities totaling approximately 1.5 billion dollars." Id. at 
616-17 (emphasis added). Keller stated that he 
communicated this goal to the board of directors at "[m]ore 
than one meeting." Id. at 15. 
 
Keller's Failure to Meet the $1.5 Billion Goal and His 
Explanations.  This goal, however, was never met or even 
approached. Keller himself stated in his deposition that 
"Credit Alliance never achieved the goal for funding that 
[he] had communicated to the board of directors." App. 16. 
Indeed, he acknowledged that, at all times from September 
1989 (the time of the ORIX acquisition) to April 1, 1993 (the 
time of his termination), funding provided by First 
Interstate Bancorp and ORIX affiliates constituted more 
than 50% of ORIX Credit Alliance's funding. Id. at 81-82. In 
December 1991, $785 million in credit facilities was 
available to ORIX Credit Alliance. App. 13. By September 
1992 -- approximately when the initial decision to 
terminate Keller was made -- the total available bank lines 
had dropped to $695 million. Id. at 48. After September 
1992, Keller did not secure any increase in bank lines. Id. 
at 24-25. 
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While Keller does not dispute that he failed to meet or 
approach the financing goal, he claims that this was due to 
factors beyond his control. See Appellant's Br. at 8-11, 35- 
36; App. 617-32 (Keller Affidavit). For example, Keller 
explained that ORIX Credit Alliance was unable to launch 
a "commercial paper program," as he had projected, 
because "there were many obstacles to obtaining a 
sufficiently high credit rating to permit Credit Alliance to 
issue and sell commercial paper on favorable terms." App. 
618. Among these, he stated, "were the absence of any 
guarantee by ORIX Corp., and the growing weakness of the 
Japanese economy which would affect Credit Alliance's 
parent." Id. Keller summarized these problems in memos 
that he sent to Ryan. Id. 
 
Keller likewise provides a plethora of reasons for his 
failure to secure bank lines of credit. He cites the 
company's credit rating, "the perceived `downturn in the 
equipment financing industry' . . . [,] Credit Alliance's 
statistics for `past dues' or untimely payments from its 
customers and other aspects of its portfolio . . .[,] bank 
`environment[s] . . . not conducive to risk of any sort' . . .[,] 
and bank limitations on lending to financing companies . . . 
or to companies outside a particular geographical area," 
"the negative impact of the recession in the United States 
and Japan during the late 1980's and early 1990's and the 
resulting reluctance of American banks to `book loans,' " 
and "banks' reluctance to lend to a company having a 
Japanese parent, given the negative economic situation in 
Japan at the time." App. 620-21. 
 
During this same period, when Keller was allegedly 
unable to raise funds by means of a commercial paper 
program or bank lines of credit, Keller repeatedly expressed 
opposition to raising funds by "asset-backed securitization," 
a process that involves the sale of accounts receivable or 
loan paper to a specially created trust that in turn sells 
interests or securities in that trust. See App. 90, 626. Ryan 
mentioned the possibility of raising funds in this way to 
Keller before or shortly after the ORIX acquisition (id. at 
90), but Keller repeatedly advised Ryan that in his opinion 
asset-backed securitization was "not for us." Id. at 28-29, 
627. 
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Finally, Keller states that he explored the possibility of 
private placements of ORIX Credit Alliance debt with 
insurance companies and other institutional investors. App. 
628. But Keller states that it was not until July 1992 (one 
or two months prior to the decision to terminate him) that 
he proposed to Ryan that ORIX Credit Alliance Corp. take 
"[t]he first step" in this direction, i.e., the selection of a 
bank to act as the company's agent. Id. at 627-28. 
 
ORIX Credit Alliance's Assessment of Keller's 
Performance.  ORIX Credit Alliance points to evidence that 
paints a picture of growing dissatisfaction within the 
company about Keller's failure to reach or approach the 
funding goal. Keller and Ryan both testified that Ryan 
repeatedly questioned Keller about the funding situation. 
App. 40, 44, 98-99. Ryan also stated that he asked Keller 
why ORIX Credit Alliance's competitors were able to obtain 
forms of financing that his company either did not pursue 
or allegedly could not obtain. Id. at 90, 92, 98. See also id. 
at 627 (Keller Affidavit). One of ORIX Credit Alliance's 
outside directors, David E. Mundell, who had served for 
nearly 20 years as the president of another leading 
commercial lending company, stated that at most, if not all, 
of the board meetings from March 1991 until April 1993 he 
questioned Keller and "expressed dissatisfaction with the 
lack of progress in raising funding." Id. at 388. At one 
meeting, Mundell added, he "expressed the view that, based 
on [his] knowledge of the equipment finance industry and 
[his] experience in managing the liability side of finance 
companies' balance sheets, [he] believed that Credit 
Alliance was not raising funds in the amounts and on the 
terms that it should have been able to in light of the 
relevant factors, such as its financial statements, the 
sufficiency of its equity, and its status in the industry." Id. 
Mundell continued that "Keller responded by offering a list 
of excuses for his inability to raise more funds," but that he 
"did not . . . make any concrete proposals for correcting the 
problems that, he claimed, were preventing him from 
producing the desired results." Id. at 389. 
 
Another outside director, Yoshiaki Ishida, who was also 
the president and chief executive officer of an ORIX parent 
corporation, stated that at several board meetings he 
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"questioned Mr. Keller about his presentation." App. 1164. 
Ishida added that he "was not satisfied with the results that 
Mr. Keller reported because the level of funds raised for 
Credit Alliance was much too low and the goal of 
independence in funding was not being achieved." Id. Ishida 
added that he told Ryan at private meetings that "the ORIX 
parent companies were not happy with the lack of progress 
in raising funds for Credit Alliance, and with Credit 
Alliance's continued reliance on another ORIX company 
(ORIX Ireland) for a large portion of its funding." Id. Ishida 
also stated that he "told Mr. Ryan, on several occasions, 
that [he] felt that Mr. Keller's work in raising funds was not 
satisfactory." Id. at 1165. 
 
In August or September of 1991, still another outside 
director, Sachio Hata, a senior officer of the parent 
Japanese corporation, suggested to Ryan that "perhaps [he] 
was remiss in giving Mr. Keller too much to do and that 
that could have been the reason why [the company's] 
financing situation was making such little progress." App. 
103. Shortly after Hata made this remark, Ryan relieved 
Keller of his responsibilities as chief credit officer, primarily 
so that he "could focus on the financing function." Id. 
 
Keller attempts to counter this evidence by pointing to 
the absence of proof that Ryan ever expressly "criticized" 
his performance or disputed his explanations for his 
inability to obtain various types of funding. Keller points to 
Ryan's inability during his deposition to recall more than 
two discussions at board meetings regarding Keller's 
performance. App. 484-90, 492-93. In addition, Keller 
points out that, in describing those discussions, Ryan did 
not mention that either involved a direct criticism of Keller. 
See Appellant's Br. at 12. Keller also notes that one 
member of the board of directors, Neil Umhafer, stated that 
during the period from 1988 to March 1992, "[n]o one 
challenged or disagreed with Keller's presentations at 
[board] meetings or suggested in any way that the 
difficulties he was encountering were in any way due to his 
performance rather than factors beyond his control."1 App. 
1126. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. ORIX Credit Alliance asserts that Umhafer is now Keller's business 
partner. Appellee's Br. at 10 n.7; App. 1128. Obviously, however, the 
question of Umhafer's credibility is not a matter to be considered at the 
summary judgment stage. 
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Selection of the New Chief Operating Officer .  In about 
December 1991 -- in the midst of the time when Keller was 
experiencing difficulty in obtaining funding -- Ryan 
announced that he planned to retire in approximately two 
and one-half years from his positions as chairman of the 
board and chief operating officer of ORIX Credit Alliance. 
App. 84. Ryan stated that he: 
 
       felt the job required someone that had a deep 
       understanding and background of the company's 
       primary business, someone who had held a line 
       position with the company, preferably someone who 
       had personally performed as many of the tasks that are 
       required to operate the company's business as 
       possible. 
 
Id. at 101. He said that he therefore considered only the 
two most senior officers from the operational side of the 
company, division managers Philip Cooper, age 43, and 
Mark Lasher, age 50. Id. at 101, 268. Keller, then 50 years 
of age, was not considered even though he had been 
considered for the position of president in 1988 when Ryan 
was chosen. Id. at 101. Keller had never held a line position 
and had never worked in or managed any of the company's 
branch offices or divisions. Id. at 65, 53. 
 
Cooper was chosen as the new chief operating officer. 
App. 101. Cooper had decades of experience in line 
positions managing the company's operations and had been 
with the company longer than Keller. Id. at 53, 101, 315. In 
May 1992, Keller, as a member of the board of directors, 
voted to ratify Cooper's promotion. Id. at 314-15, 345. 
 
The April 13, 1992 Conversation.  Keller relies most 
heavily on a conversation he had with Ryan on April 13, 
1992. Keller described this conversation as follows at his 
deposition: 
 
       [Ryan] assured me that he felt comfortable that Orix 
       would be there for us as far as being able to loan us 
       money. But then [he] made a comment that . . . "We 
       really can't complain if we're not out developing 
       relationships." 
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       He said to me that he didn't see me traveling around 
       the country visiting with banks. He said I was spending 
       a lot of time in New York City. 
        * * * 
 
       And then he said . . . "If you are getting too old for the 
       job, maybe you should go hire one or two young 
       bankers." 
 
App. 27 (emphasis added). 
 
Keller said that, because of Ryan's reference to Keller's 
age, Keller prepared a handwritten summary of the meeting 
within an hour or two after it ended. App. 25. These 
handwritten notes state in pertinent part: 
 
       DNR then suggested that we cannot complain about 
       not being able to fund our needs if we have not made 
       a good effort to develop lines etc. -- he said I don't see 
       you traveling across . . . country developing 
       relationships I see you spending a lot of time in NYC. 
       He suggested I hire one or two young bankers. Also 
       discussed possibility of securitization if necessary. 
 
Id. at 168-69. The handwritten summary contains no 
reference to Ryan's alleged words "If you are getting too 
old," but Keller explained at the deposition: 
 
       The reason I made those notes in the first place was 
       because of that statement, I didn't need these notes to 
       remind me of what he said. 
 
Id. at 26. 
 
The Decision to Discharge Keller.  By August or September 
1992, Ryan had decided that Keller should be discharged. 
App. 91, 1156. After Ryan made his initial decision, he 
discussed it with at least four individuals who were 
directors or senior officers of the company, and all 
expressed agreement. Id. at 1156-57. Those informed 
included Mundell, Ishida, Cooper, and Jacob Mehl, an 
executive vice president and the general counsel of the 
company. Id. 
 
Ryan and Cooper then drew up a list of criteria to be 
used in identifying a replacement. App. 316. Among their 
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primary criteria were "experience in implementing asset- 
backed securitization programs and other creative forms of 
[fundraising]," "strong skills in working with rating agencies 
and bankers, particularly Japanese bankers," and a 
"results driven" character. Id. at 316. According to Cooper, 
"[t]hese were among the areas in which we felt that Mr. 
Keller's skills were inadequate for his job at Credit 
Alliance." Id. 
 
Cooper communicated these criteria to an executive 
search firm, which subsequently proposed several 
candidates. App. 316. From among these, Ryan selected 
Joseph McDevitt, who was born on December 12, 1946, 
and is thus four years, ten months, and 19 days younger 
than Keller. Id. at 317, 269, 610. 
 
Keller's Final Months.  In September 1992 (i.e., at roughly 
the time when Ryan made his initial decision to terminate 
Keller), Ryan began to explore on his own the possibility of 
obtaining funding by means of asset-based securitization. 
App. 91. Shortly thereafter, Goldman Sachs & Co. was 
engaged by Cooper and Ryan for a securitization program, 
and within two years the company had closed two asset- 
backed securitization deals and raised nearly $500 million. 
Id. at 389. 
 
Keller was not informed of Ryan's initial decision to 
discharge him, App. 590-92, and thus in late 1992 or early 
1993 Keller presented to Cooper a one-page document 
entitled "TIMETABLE FOR DIVERSIFICATION OF FUNDING 
SOURCES." This plan listed such items as the following: 
 
       2/8-5/1/93  Meet bankers and gauge level of interest 
                   in providing credit facilities. 
 
       2/9/93      Visit S&P; discuss 9-month results; 
                   determine feasibility of "A-2" rating 
                   before year-end numbers are available. If 
                   feasible, set up rating meeting as soon 
                   as possible. If not feasible, see below. 
 
       3/15/93     Decide if public securitization is a viable 
                   funding source. If so, move to market (90 
                   days). 
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App. 1107. In response to questioning by Keller's attorney, 
Ryan acknowledged that most, if not all, of these steps were 
eventually taken, id. at 542-45, but Keller has not pointed 
to any evidence that any of the steps proposed were novel 
or that he did much if anything to accomplish any of the 
objectives.2 
 
Keller was formally discharged by unanimous vote of the 
executive committee of the board of directors on April 1, 
1993, effective on that date. App. 1159, 1162. Ryan went to 
Keller's office to inform him of the decision. Id. at 591. 
Keller states that the following occurred: 
 
       I asked Dan if he was asking for my resignation 
       because of my age and reminded him of the 
       conversation that we had in April of `92 when he was 
       -- when he asked me if I was getting too old for the job 
       and suggested that I, if I were, that I hire one or two 
       young bankers to travel around the country. He gave 
       me -- there was no response to that, to my comments. 
 
Id. at 593. 
 
Keller subsequently asked to "get together [with Ryan] to 
discuss [his] situation" (App. 595), and the two men met for 
lunch at a Manhattan restaurant on approximately April 9. 
Id. at 595-96. During the lunch, according to Keller, Ryan 
stated that Keller's suggestion of a "$1 million plus" 
severance package was out of the question, and Ryan 
added: 
 
       "Look, you do what you have to do, you know. I have 
       discussed this with Jerry Mehl, and he doesn't see that 
       we will have a problem." 
 
       And then he said, "But, you know, Jerry is a lawyer 
       and lawyers aren't always right." 
 
Id. at 597. 
 
McDevitt's Performance.  On April 5, 1993, McDevitt 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As previously noted, Keller does point to evidence that in July 1992 he 
took the "first step" to implement a program of private placement, i.e., 
he 
identified the bank that he wanted to serve as the company's agent. App. 
628-29. 
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replaced Keller, and within a year he raised well over $1.5 
billion in new credit facilities, including almost $2 million 
in bank lines, $250 million through a first offering of asset- 
backed securities, $275 million through a private 
placement of notes, $1 billion in syndicated credit facilities, 
and $300 million through the sale of commercial paper. 
App. 311-14. 
 
B. 
 
In August 1993, Keller commenced this action in federal 
district court, claiming that ORIX Credit Alliance denied 
him promotion to the position of chief operating officer and 
ultimately terminated him because of his age, in violation of 
the ADEA and the NJLAD. ORIX Credit Alliance moved for 
summary judgment, and the district court granted that 
motion. 
 
With respect to Keller's discharge claims, the district 
court first held that Keller had failed to make out a prima 
facie case under the scheme of proof set out in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Specifically, 
the court held that Keller had not identified evidence 
showing that he was qualified for the position or that he 
was " `replaced by someone significantly younger to permit 
an inference of age discrimination.' " Dist. Ct. Op. at 8 
(quoting Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 
1088 (3d Cir. 1992)). The court then concluded that, even 
if Keller had established a prima facie case, ORIX Credit 
Alliance had proffered a legitimate business reason for 
Keller's dismissal, namely, "Keller's failure to make 
adequate progress toward the $1.5 billion independent 
financing goal," and that Keller had not pointed to evidence 
that a reasonable jury could view as establishing pretext or 
as proving that his discharge was due to age 
discrimination. Id. at 10-11. 
 
With respect to Keller's denial-of-promotion claim, the 
court reasoned that the same evidence of Keller's failure to 
meet or approach the financing goal was sufficient to 
warrant summary judgment on that claim as well. Id. at 11. 
Keller then took this appeal. 
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II. 
 
We turn first to Keller's discharge claim. Keller contends 
that this claim should have survived summary judgment 
under either McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 
A. McDonnell Douglas 
 
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court created a 
special scheme for structuring the presentation of evidence 
in discriminatory treatment cases under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-1 et seq. Our 
court has applied a slightly modified version of this scheme 
in ADEA cases. See, e.g., Waldron v. SL Industries Inc., 56 
F.3d 491, 494-95 (3d Cir. 1995); Sempier v. Johnson & 
Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 
2611 (1995); Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 829-30 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 
1214 (3d Cir. 1988).3 Cf. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin 
Caterers Corp., 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996) (assuming 
arguendo that McDonnell Douglas applies under ADEA). 
 
The McDonnell Douglas scheme has three steps. First, the 
plaintiff must produce evidence that is sufficient to 
convince a reasonable factfinder to find all of the elements 
of a prima facie case. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502, 506 (1993). When the plaintiff alleges unlawful 
discharge based on age, the prima facie case requires proof 
that (i) the plaintiff was a member of the protected class, 
i.e., was 40 years of age or older (see 29 U.S.C. S631(a)), (ii) 
that the plaintiff was discharged, (iii) that the plaintiff was 
qualified for the job, and (iv) that the plaintiff was replaced 
by a sufficiently younger person to create an inference of 
age discrimination. Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728. 
 
If the plaintiff offers sufficient proof of these elements, 
step two is reached. The burden of production (but not the 
burden of persuasion) shifts to the defendant, who must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Although Keller's complaint grounded his discharge claim on both the 
federal ADEA and the NJLAD (see App. 4), Keller's brief relies solely on 
the ADEA with respect to the discharge issue. See Appellant's Br. at 22- 
39. We therefore confine this portion of our opinion to the ADEA. 
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then offer evidence that is sufficient, if believed, to support 
a finding that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the discharge. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07. If the 
defendant cannot satisfy this burden, judgment must be 
entered for the plaintiff. Id. at 509. On the other hand, if 
the defendant does satisfy this burden, step three is 
reached. The plaintiff may then survive summary judgment 
or judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence 
 
       from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) 
       disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; 
       or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason 
       was more likely than not a motivating or determinative 
       cause of the employer's action. 
 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). Accord 
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 
1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 
2532 (1997). 
 
In this appeal, we find it unnecessary to consider steps 
one and two of the McDonnell Douglas scheme. Step two is 
not contested, and although the parties dispute whether 
Keller met step one, we will assume for the sake of 
argument that he did, because we agree with the district 
court that Keller did not satisfy step three under either the 
first or second prong of the Fuentes test. 
 
1. Prong One.  As noted, a plaintiff may satisfy this 
prong by offering evidence "from which a factfinder could 
reasonably . . . disbelieve the employer's articulated 
legitimate reasons." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. But as we 
have explained: 
 
       To discredit the employer's proffered reason . . . the 
       plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's 
       decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual 
       dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus 
       motivated the employer, not whether the employer is 
       wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent. Rather, the non- 
       moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, 
       implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
       contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate 
       reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder 
       could rationally find them unworthy of credence. 
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Id. at 765. As another court of appeals has put it, "federal 
courts are not arbitral boards ruling on the strength of 
`cause' for discharge. The question is not whether the 
employer made the best, or even a sound, business 
decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination]." 
Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
 
The defendant in this case provided evidence that it had 
a particularly powerful reason for discharging Keller, i.e., 
his failure to meet or even approach the goal of raising $1.5 
billion in financing. As previously noted, ORIX Credit 
Alliance makes a profit by borrowing money and then 
lending it at a higher rate. Consequently, borrowed money 
is the company's life blood, and it thus seems clear (and we 
do not understand Keller to disagree) that the company 
would have had a strong reason for discharging a key 
executive who unjustifiably failed to meet a reasonable 
objective relating to the raising of funds. Moreover, Keller 
cannot argue that the objective of raising $1.5 billion was 
unreasonable when it was originally set: he himself set that 
goal, and he assured the board of directors that he could 
meet it. 
 
Instead, Keller makes two chief arguments: first, that the 
evidence in the summary judgment record shows that his 
inability to meet or approach the $1.5 billion objective was 
due to factors beyond his control and, second, that 
evidence in the summary judgment record shows that Ryan 
knew that this was so. We will discuss each of these 
arguments in turn. 
 
Evidence that Keller's failure to reach or approach the 
$1.5 million goal was due to factors beyond his control.  In 
considering this argument, it is critical to keep in mind that 
the question under the first prong of the Fuentes test is not 
whether "the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken." 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. Accordingly, Keller cannot survive 
summary judgment under this prong simply by pointing to 
evidence that could convince a reasonable factfinder that he 
did as well as he could under the circumstances. Rather, 
he "must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the 
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a 
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reasonable factfinder could rationally find them`unworthy 
of credence.' " Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. In simpler terms, he 
must show, not merely that the employer's proffered reason 
was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot 
have been the employer's real reason. 
 
When this point is kept in mind, it is apparent that Keller 
failed to satisfy prong one of Fuentes. Whether Keller could 
have met or come close to the $1.5 billion goal under the 
business conditions that prevailed from 1989 to 1992 is a 
complicated question that would be difficult to resolve 
without expert testimony of a sort that is lacking in the 
summary judgment record of this case. But the relevant 
question is not whether Keller could have done better; 
instead, the relevant question is whether the evidence 
shows that it was so clear that Keller could not have done 
better that ORIX Credit Alliance could not have believed 
otherwise. The answer to this question is plainly negative. 
 
The evidence relating to asset-backed securitization 
illustrates the weakness of Keller's position. It is 
undisputed that Ryan had an early interest in this method 
of raising funds. Ryan discussed asset-backed 
securitization with Keller before or shortly after the ORIX 
acquisition, and it is also undisputed that Keller rejected 
this idea. Ryan testified without contradiction that on many 
subsequent occasions he raised the possibility of asset- 
backed securitization with Keller. Ryan said that every time 
he read an article in the Wall Street Journal about a 
competitor's utilization of this technique, he mentioned the 
subject to Keller, App. 90, and it is undisputed that Keller's 
consistent response was that asset-backed securitization 
should not be pursued by ORIX Credit Alliance, in part 
because of the nature of its business. Id. at 28. Indeed, 
Keller's own affidavit reiterates this position. Id. at 626-28. 
Finally, in September 1992, Ryan decided to explore the 
matter on his own without Keller's knowledge or 
participation. Ryan met with leading investment banking 
firms, engaged the services of one such firm, and within 
two years the company raised nearly $500 million through 
two offerings of asset-backed securities. In the face of this 
evidence, a reasonable factfinder could not find that ORIX 
Credit Alliance's dissatisfaction with Keller's failure to 
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pursue asset-backed securitization was so clearly wrong 
that it cannot have been sincere. 
 
Keller's evidence relating to bank lines of credit likewise 
falls short of what would be necessary to show that ORIX 
Credit Alliance's dissatisfaction with his performance was 
so clearly unfounded that it cannot have been sincere. 
Keller's brief states: 
 
       [B]anks told Keller that they were not interested in 
       companies outside their region; that their "credit 
       culture [had] bec[o]me very conservative;" that they 
       were troubled by the Japanese economy and the level 
       of delinquent accounts at Credit Alliance, and sought 
       business only with highly rated companies; that they 
       perceived a "downturn in the equipment financing 
       industry . . . which they expect will become even 
       worse." 
 
Appellant's Br. at 10 (footnotes omitted). 
 
This recital is based on four file memos written by Keller 
during a period of more than three years. See Appellant's 
Br. at 10 & nn.7-10. The first memo relates that an officer 
of a regional bank with offices in Florida and Georgia told 
Keller that his bank "only does business with local 
companies or national companies with local (Florida/ 
Georgia) operations." App. 394. The second memo did not 
report that the bank in question had refused to extend 
credit; instead, it concluded by saying: "We decided to meet 
again after [the bank officer] has received and reviewed our 
1992 financial information." Id. at 401. The third memo, 
dated several months after the decision to terminate Keller 
was made, does recount that an officer at a major bank 
"repeated his many stories as to why it [was] difficult for 
him to get a credit facility approved for our company." Id. 
at 402. The final memo stated that an officer at a major 
bank told Keller (in 1990) that "the Bank would prefer to 
delay providing . . . a line of credit." Id. at 666. Taken 
together, these file memos and the additional memos cited 
in Keller's affidavit (see id. at 620-21) constitute evidence 
from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that 
Keller experienced difficulties in securing bank lines, but 
they could not persuade a reasonable factfinder that it was 
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so plainly impossible for Keller to secure additional lines of 
credit from other banks during the 1989-1992 period that 
ORIX Credit Alliance's dissatisfaction with his performance 
must not have been real. 
 
We will not discuss the evidence relating to Keller's 
failure to obtain more funding by other means. However, 
after examining all of the evidence identified in Keller's brief 
for the purpose of showing that his failure to meet or 
approach the $1.5 billion financing goal was due to factors 
beyond his control, we are convinced that Keller has not 
shown that it was so plain that he could not have done 
substantially better under the circumstances that ORIX 
Credit Alliance could not have truly believed otherwise. 
 
Evidence that Ryan knew Keller could not have done 
better.  Keller also argues in his brief that the summary 
judgment record contains evidence that Ryan knew that 
Keller could not have done appreciably better under the 
business circumstances that prevailed from 1989 through 
1992. See Appellant's Br. at 8-9. This argument, however, 
is simply not supported by the record. 
 
Keller's brief states that "Ryan repeatedly acknowledged" 
that "Keller's inability to obtain more credit on favorable 
terms was due to circumstances beyond his control." 
Appellant's Br. at 35-36. But our review of the record 
citations provided in Keller's brief has not disclosed a single 
such acknowledgment. Instead, most of the record citations 
are based on passages from Ryan's deposition during which 
the following occurred. Keller's attorney showed Ryan 
documents that had been written by Keller and that 
memorialized statements that had allegedly been made by 
third parties, such as officers of banks or rating agencies, 
and that explained why these third parties were unwilling 
to take various actions that would have been favorable to 
ORIX Credit Alliance. Keller's attorney then asked Ryan 
whether he had any basis for disputing the accuracy of the 
documents, and Ryan (who generally had no recollection of 
previously seeing the documents) said that he had no basis 
for disputing their accuracy. See Appellant's Br. at 10 & 
nn.7-10 (citing App. 554-55, 558-59, 561-6, 563-646). 
 These exchanges merely show that Ryan did not dispute 
the accuracy of particular documents that recounted a 
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limited number of specific statements allegedly made over 
the course of several years by individuals associated with 
particular banks and rating agencies. A factfinder could not 
reasonably draw from these exchanges the general 
conclusion that Ryan "repeatedly acknowledged" that 
"Keller's inability to obtain credit on favorable terms was 
due to circumstances beyond his control." Appellant's Br. 
at 35-36. 
 
Keller also relies on the assertion that his performance 
was never "criticized" prior to the April 13 meeting with 
Ryan, and he argues that this absence of criticism shows 
that ORIX Credit Alliance was not sincerely disturbed by 
his failure to approach the $1.5 billion goal. Appellant's Br. 
at 29, 36. The summary judgment record contains evidence 
that Keller was criticized (director Mundell's comments are 
perhaps the clearest example), but Keller claims that he 
was never "criticized," except at the April 13, 1992 meeting, 
and in the present procedural posture of the case, we 
accept Keller's position. 
 
Keller does not dispute, however, that he was repeatedly 
"questioned" by Ryan and others about this matter, and 
therefore the question is to what extent a reasonable 
factfinder could infer from the absence of criticism (as 
distinct from questioning) that ORIX Credit Alliance was 
not really troubled by Keller's failure to approach the $1.5 
billion goal. We conclude that a reasonable factfinder could 
draw only a relatively weak inference. Employers who are 
dissatisfied with the performance of their employees 
sometimes voice express criticism to those employees, but 
employers do not always do so. See Healy, 860 F.2d at 
1216 ("The company is under no obligation to warn plaintiff 
of complaints regarding his performance and, if anything, 
the effect of such evidence is equivocal, perhaps indicating 
that plaintiff was receiving the benefit of the doubt.") 
(citation omitted). Evidence that a plaintiff was not 
criticized may take on significance if the plaintiff can show 
that other comparable employees regularly received express 
evaluations of their work, but Keller does not point to any 
such evidence. Moreover, in light of the patent importance 
of the $1.5 billion goal, and in light of the steady 
"questioning" of Keller about this matter, the absence of 
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explicit criticism cannot reasonably be viewed as having 
great importance. 
 
In sum, after considering all of the evidence that has 
been called to our attention, we conclude that a reasonable 
factfinder could not find that the words, actions, or 
omissions of the relevant ORIX Credit Alliance officers 
evidenced their belief that Keller was doing as well as could 
be expected under the circumstances. For this reason and 
the others explained above, we therefore hold that Keller 
cannot defeat summary judgment based on the first prong 
of the Fuentes test. 
 
2. Prong Two.  Accordingly, we proceed to the question 
whether Keller can survive summary judgment under prong 
two of the Fuentes test. Under this prong, Keller must 
identify evidence in the summary judgment record that 
"allows the fact finder to infer that discrimination was more 
likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
adverse employment action." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762. In 
other words, under this prong, Keller must point to 
evidence that proves age discrimination in the same way 
that critical facts are generally proved -- based solely on 
the natural probative force of the evidence. 
 
Keller's best evidence under prong two is his account of 
his conversation with Ryan on April 13, 1992. As previously 
noted, Keller testified that Ryan made the following 
comments: 
 
       "We really can't complain if we're not out developing 
       relationships." 
 
       He said to me that he didn't see me traveling around 
       the country visiting with banks. He said I was spending 
       a lot of time in New York City. . . . 
 
       And then he said . . . "If you are getting too old for the 
       job, maybe you should hire one or two young bankers." 
 
App. 27 (emphasis added). Although Ryan denied using the 
words "If you are getting too old for the job," and although 
Keller's contemporaneous notes of the conversation omit 
any mention of this phrase, we are required, in reviewing 
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
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ORIX Credit Alliance, to accept Keller's account of the 
conversation. 
 Ryan's alleged words certainly constitute evidence from 
which a reasonable factfinder could draw an inference of 
age-based animus, but we do not think that these words 
alone could reasonably be viewed as sufficient to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that age was a 
determinative cause of Keller's subsequent termination. For 
one thing, the alleged comment occurred four or five 
months prior to the time when Ryan decided that Keller 
should be discharged. In addition, the alleged remark did 
not refer to the question whether Keller should be retained 
or fired but instead concerned the hiring of other employees 
to assist him. Furthermore, the alleged statement pertained 
to only one method of raising funds -- obtaining lines of 
credit from banks outside New York City by traveling to 
meet their officers. Even if Ryan's alleged statement is 
interpreted to mean that he felt that Keller might be getting 
too old to do the traveling necessary to raise funds in this 
way, no evidence has been brought to our attention that 
other methods of raising funds, such as beginning a 
commercial paper program or utilizing asset-backed 
securitization, would have required extensive travel. 
 
Keller's remaining evidence under prong two is 
insubstantial. Keller's statistical evidence is of little if any 
value.4 Moreover, we reject Keller's suggestion that Ryan's 
actions during his meeting with Keller on April 1, 1993, 
when he asked for Keller's resignation, and his comments 
during their subsequent restaurant meeting approximately 
one week later constitute significant evidence of age-based 
animus. 
 
During the meeting on April 1, 1993, Ryan gave Keller a 
draft letter of resignation to consider. See App. at 594. 
Under the terms set out in this letter, Keller would have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Keller's brief states: "all six employees at or above the vice 
president 
level whom defendant has let go since September 1989 are over 40, even 
though 22% of such positions are held by individuals under 40." 
Appellant's Br. at 7. Without any demonstration of the statistical 
significance of this data, a factfinder could not reasonably accord it 
much if any weight. 
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received certain substantial benefits, including one-half his 
annual salary plus $50,000. See App. 1114. In return, 
Keller would have released ORIX Credit Alliance from all 
claims. Id. at 1115. Noting that this blanket release would 
have presumably included claims of age discrimination, 
Keller seems to imply that the inclusion of this provision in 
the letter evidences ORIX Credit Alliance's awareness that 
Keller had grounds for an age-discrimination claim against 
it. Appellant's Br. at 4. This implication is far-fetched. 
Without evidence that a request for a blanket release is not 
a common practice when an executive is asked to resign 
under terms such as those set out in the letter, the 
inclusion of this clause in the proposed letter of resignation 
has little evidentiary worth. 
 
Likewise, we reject Keller's argument that Ryan's 
comments during the restaurant meeting evidenced 
consciousness of guilt of age discrimination. See Appellant's 
Br. at 4, 35. At the April 1, 1993 meeting, Keller had asked 
Ryan: 
 
       "if he was asking for [Keller's] resignation because of 
       [his] age and [Keller] reminded him of the conversation 
       that [they] had in April of `92 when . . . he asked 
       [Keller] if [he] was getting too old for the job and 
       suggested that . . . if [he] were, that [he] hire one or two 
       young bankers. 
 
Id. at 593. At his deposition, Ryan stated that he assumed, 
based on Keller's comment, that Keller "was thinking of an 
age discrimination suit." Id. at 512-13. At the subsequent 
restaurant meeting, after rejecting Keller's request for a "$1 
million plus" severance package, Ryan said: 
 
       Look, you do what you have to do . . . I have discussed 
       this with Jerry Mehl [the ORIX Credit Alliance general 
       counsel] and he doesn't see that we will have a problem 
       . . . [b]ut, you know, Jerry is a lawyer and lawyers 
       aren't always right. 
 
Id. at 597. 
 
Referring to these events, Keller's brief states: 
 
       Ryan's comments that Credit Alliance could be found 
       liable for age discrimination are evidence that, at a 
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       minimum, he indeed had made the biased statement 
       Keller attributed to him. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 4. Keller further argues that evidence of 
age discrimination is provided by "Ryan's statements at the 
time of Keller's discharge that he assumed that Keller 
would sue for age discrimination." Appellant's Br. at 35 
(footnote omitted). These arguments have no merit. 
 When Keller asked at the April 1, 1992 meeting whether 
he was being fired because of his age, any reasonable 
person would have realized that Keller might thereafter sue 
for age discrimination. Thus, Ryan's assumption that Keller 
might file such a suit hardly constitutes evidence of 
consciousness of guilt. 
 
Furthermore, Ryan's statement that his company's 
general counsel might turn out to be wrong in predicting 
that Keller's termination would not cause a "problem" has 
little if any evidentiary value to show that Ryan believed 
that Keller had a meritorious age-discrimination claim. 
Needless to say, even an ultimately unsuccessful claim may 
constitute a "problem," and due to the vagaries of the legal 
process, unmeritorious suits are not always unsuccessful 
(just as meritorious suits do not always succeed). 
 
In assessing whether the proof in this case is sufficient to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that age was 
a determinative cause of Keller's termination, a reasonable 
factfinder would have to consider, in addition to the 
evidence noted above, the proof underlying the elements of 
the prima facie case. Thus, a reasonable factfinder would 
have to weigh the fact that Keller, who was 51 years old 
when fired, was replaced by a man who was about four 
years and ten and one-half months younger. 
 
Finally, a reasonable factfinder would also have to 
consider the evidence, which we discussed in part IIA1 of 
this opinion, that ORIX Credit Alliance had a powerful, 
legitimate reason for discharging Keller, namely, his failure 
to meet or even approach the critical $1.5 billion goal that 
he himself had set. A reasonable factfinder would have to 
ask whether a company like ORIX Credit Alliance was more 
likely to be concerned about Keller's failure to raise these 
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funds or about replacing him with a man who was some 
four years and ten and one-half months younger. 
 
Considering all of the evidence that is relevant with 
respect to prong two, we conclude that a reasonable 
factfinder could not find that the proof is sufficient to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that age was 
a determinative factor in Keller's termination. 
Consequently, we hold that Keller cannot survive summary 
judgment under prong two of the Fuentes test. Since we 
have already held that he failed under prong one as well, it 
follows that he cannot defeat summary judgment under the 
scheme of proof set out in McDonnell Douglas. 
 B. Price Waterhouse 
 
We therefore move on to Keller's argument that he was 
entitled to survive summary judgment under Price 
Waterhouse. Under Justice O'Connor's controlling opinion 
in Price Waterhouse, if a plaintiff "show[s] by direct evidence 
that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the 
decision," the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer 
"to show that the decision would have been the same 
absent discrimination." 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J. 
concurring) (emphasis added). See Armbruster v. Unisys 
Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1994). The precise 
meaning of Justice O'Connor's term "direct evidence" has 
divided the courts. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content 
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1161, 1220-21 (1995) (describing the varying 
approaches of the circuits); Note, Despite the Smoke, There 
Is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives 
Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 
Stan. L. Rev. 959, 970-79 (1994) (same). Similarly, when 
the present case was before the panel, the majority and the 
dissent disagreed on the question whether Ryan's alleged 
statement on April 13, 1992, constituted "direct evidence" 
within the meaning of Price Waterhouse. 
 
On reconsidering this case en banc, we conclude that it 
is not necessary for us to resolve this question. We have 
held in part IIA2 of this opinion that a reasonable jury 
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could not find by a preponderance that age was a 
determinative factor. If we held that Keller provided "direct 
evidence" within the meaning of Price Waterhouse, Keller 
could avoid summary judgment only if a reasonable jury 
could fail to find by a preponderance that age was not a 
determinative factor. Here, for the reasons explained above 
in part IIA2 of this opinion, a reasonable factfinder could 
not fail to find by a preponderance that age was not a 
determinative factor in Keller's termination. We therefore 
hold that Keller cannot survive summary judgment on his 
discharge claim under Price Waterhouse. 
 
III. 
 
We proceed finally to Keller's claim that ORIX Credit 
Alliance failed to promote him to the position of chief 
operating officer in May 1992 because of his age. Assuming 
for the sake of argument that Keller could make out the 
elements of a prima facie case with respect to this 
promotion decision, we hold that ORIX Credit Alliance 
proffered a legitimate explanation for the decision and that 
Keller did not satisfy either prong one or two of the Fuentes 
test.5 
 
Ryan explained that he felt that the job of chief operating 
officer "required someone [who] had a deep understanding 
and background of the company's primary business, 
someone who held a line position with the company, 
preferably someone who had personally performed as many 
of the tasks that are required to operate the company's 
business as possible." App. 101. Keller has not pointed to 
any evidence showing that ORIX Credit Alliance did not in 
fact rely on this criteria in choosing the new chief operating 
officer. Nor has Keller pointed to any evidence that he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although Keller relies on the NJLAD with respect to his failure-to- 
promote claim, the relevant legal principles are the same as those 
applicable under the ADEA. See McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 
820 (3d Cir. 1994) (predicting New Jersey Supreme Court would follow 
Hicks); Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 570 A.2d 103 (N.J. 1990) 
(McDonnell Douglas scheme applies under LAD); Burke v. Township of 
Franklin, 619 A.2d 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (looking to ADEA 
in interpreting LAD). 
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possessed such experience. Furthermore, the selection of 
the new chief operating officer came at a time when Keller 
was failing in the performance of the job he then held. 
Months earlier, he had been relieved of his responsibilities 
as chief credit officer so that he could focus on raising 
funds, and by May 1992, it is undisputed that Keller was 
being repeatedly questioned about his failure to meet or 
approach the $1.5 billion target. Under these 
circumstances, it is apparent that the company had 
legitimate reasons for failing to promote Keller to the top 
position of chief operating officer. Thus, Keller failed to 
satisfy prong one of the Fuentes test. 
 
We likewise hold that Keller failed to meet prong two of 
that test. We have already discussed all of the evidence on 
which Keller relies to show age discrimination, and we will 
therefore not discuss that evidence again here. Considering 
all of that evidence, and keeping in mind that Ryan's 
alleged comment on April 13, 1992, came only a few weeks 
before the promotion decision was made, we nevertheless 
conclude that the evidence is insufficient to convince a 
reasonable factfinder by a preponderance that age was a 
determinative factor in the promotion decision. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons explained above, we therefore affirm the 
decision of the district court granting summary judgment in 
favor of ORIX Credit Alliance on all of Keller's claims. 
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ROTH, J. concurring and dissenting: 
 
I join in all parts of the majority opinion except for Part 
II.B. I do not believe that we can avoid resolving the 
question of whether Ryan's alleged statement on April 13, 
1992, constituted "direct evidence" within the meaning of 
Price Waterhouse. In avoiding this question, the majority is 
by necessity deciding something. First of all, it is deciding 
that "direct" evidence may be of such little probative value 
that it need not rise to the level of creating a material issue 
of fact or of preventing a grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant. If such a decision were not implicit 
in the majority's conclusion in Part II.B, the majority would 
have not been able to affirm the district court's granting of 
summary judgment in a case in which there is the 
possibility that "direct evidence" has been proffered by the 
non-moving plaintiff. I do not consider that "direct 
evidence" could be of such little probative value that, if it 
were present in any given case, it would be sufficient to be 
classified as "direct" but not sufficient to prevent summary 
judgment. 
 
A second implied determination that can be read into 
Part II.B is that "direct evidence" may be determined by 
reviewing all the evidence that will be presented to the fact 
finder. I am troubled by the breadth of such a holding. 
Moreover, I am not sure that it can be read to follow from 
Justice O'Connor's statement in Price Waterhouse . I would 
conclude instead that, when Ryan's April 13 remark is 
viewed in the context in which it was made and in light of 
the possible ambiguities inherent in the language he used, 
his statement is not "direct evidence." 
 
A third assumption that I can draw from the reasoning of 
Part II.B is that the majority arrived at the decision that it 
did in Part II.A.2 only by, in essence, determining that 
Ryan's April 13 remark was not "direct evidence" of 
discrimination. If that is so, then why not say so. 
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act makes it 
unlawful to "discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. 
S 623(a)(1). Like other employment discrimination claims, 
claims under the ADEA can be established either by the 
presentation of direct evidence of discrimination under Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), or of evidence 
which creates an inference of discrimination under the 
framework of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine. 
 
The sum of Keller's argument on appeal is that there is 
sufficient evidence in this case to withstand a motion for 
summary judgment under either approach. The majority 
disagrees, finding that while that may be the sum, it carries 
little substance. Instead, the majority concludes that the 
evidence is insufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder 
that Credit Alliance discriminated against Keller based on 
his age. For the reasons which follow, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I. MIXED MOTIVE UNDER PRICE WATERHOUSE 
 
As we have said, when an employee presents evidence 
supporting a reasonable inference that a decisionmaker 
relied upon an illegitimate criterion, summary judgment for 
the employer is not appropriate. Weldon v. Kraft , 896 F.2d 
793, 797 (3d Cir. 1990); Hankins v. Temple University, 829 
F.2d 437, 440 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
       A plaintiff who makes such a case in resisting the 
       defendant's motion for summary judgment does not 
       need the help of McDonnell Douglas to resist the 
       motion. He walks as it were without crutches. For he 
       has presented enough evidence to defeat a motion for 
       summary judgment under the general test for the grant 
       of such a motion . . . . 
 
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 1990). 
We have recognized that "[w]hen direct evidence is 
available, problems of proof are no different than in other 
civil cases." Goodman v. Lukens Steel Company, 777 F.2d 
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113, 130 (3d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). The issue 
becomes whether the employer did in fact rely upon the 
illegitimate criterion, which "is precisely the sort of question 
which must be left to the jury." Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 
894 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
In my view, Keller provided evidence which reflects a 
discriminatory animus on the part of a person involved in 
the decisionmaking process. As the majority notes, Keller 
testified that during the first meeting in which he was ever 
criticized about his job performance, Ryan specifically 
stated, "If you are getting too old for the job, maybe you 
should hire one or two young bankers."6  
 
I believe that Ryan's statement is sufficient evidence of a 
discriminatory animus under Price Waterhouse. First, as 
CEO of the company, Ryan is clearly a decisionmaker, and 
in this case has admitted that he was the principal 
decisionmaker in firing Keller. Second, it seems rather 
obvious that Ryan's suggestion that Keller may be getting 
too old to perform his job properly and that he hire younger 
bankers could reflect a discriminatory animus on the basis 
of age. Such a comment, if true, is by no means shrouded 
in ambiguity, and there is no evidence to suggest that it 
was stated facetiously. In addition, the comment was made 
during a conversation about Keller's performance. 
According to Keller, the comment was made at the meeting 
in which he was first informed that his performance was 
considered unsatisfactory. I believe, therefore, that a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the comment was 
related to the decisionmaking process itself. As the majority 
notes, Ryan was critical of Keller's performance at the time 
this alleged comment was made. Majority Opinion at 16-17. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The majority concludes that the "too old" comment is insufficient proof 
of age-based animus because it occurred "four or five months" prior to 
the discharge decision and only pertained to one aspect of Keller's 
duties. Majority Opinion at 20-21. While this is certainly a powerful 
argument, it is an interpretation which goes to the weight of the 
evidence, and is a question for the finder of fact. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 
913 F.2d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he task of disambiguating 
ambiguous utterances is for trial, not for summary judgment. On a 
motion for summary judgment the ambiguities in a witness's testimony 
must be resolved against the moving party."). 
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Since Ryan decided to fire Keller only a few months later, 
the age-related comment is probative of the factors 
considered in Ryan's decision to terminate Keller. See 
Robinson v. PPG Indus. Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir. 
1994) (holding that comments about the company not 
keeping employees on until they reached sixty-five could 
not be considered stray remarks for the purposes of 
summary judgment); Shager, 913 F.2d at 400-02 (holding 
that comments including "These older people don't much 
like or much care for us baby boomers, but there isn't 
much they can do about it," constituted direct evidence at 
the summary judgment phase). 
 
I do not consider this comment a stray remark, 
insufficient as direct evidence of discrimination, simply 
because it was the only age-related remark Keller could 
recall. Just as there are "no talismanic expressions which 
must be invoked as a condition-precedent to the application 
of laws designed to protect against discrimination," there is 
also no specific frequency with which discriminatory 
remarks must be expressed before our protective laws are 
triggered. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corporation, 85 
F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir. 1996). The key inquiry is not the 
number of times a comment is made but the context in 
which it is made. 
 
If the single comment is made by a decisionmaker and 
reflects a discriminatory animus toward the plaintiff in the 
decisionmaking process, it might well constitute direct 
evidence of discrimination. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 
at 241 ("The critical inquiry . . . is whether[the illegitimate 
criterion] was a factor in the employment decision . . . ."). 
Unlike hostile environment claims, Price Waterhouse 
considers only the nature and probative value of the alleged 
discriminatory comment, and not the frequency with which 
it was stated, because an employer's "[r]eliance on [illegal] 
factors is exactly what the threat of Title VII liability was 
meant to deter." Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As 
discussed above, the alleged age-related remark in this case 
was made by the principal decisionmaker during his 
critique of Keller's work performance, and could be 
interpreted as reflecting a negative attitude toward his age. 
See Robinson, 23 F.3d at 1165 (holding that potentially age- 
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related comments made by the supervisor who decided to 
terminate the plaintiff were sufficient direct evidence of 
discrimination to survive summary judgment). 
 
As we have stated, since "discriminatory comments by an 
executive connected with the decisionmaking process will 
often be the plaintiff's strongest circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination, they are highly relevant . . . ." Abrams v. 
Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1995). Since 
Keller presented evidence which could allow a factfinder to 
conclude that Ryan relied on an illegitimate criterion in 
making his employment decision, I believe that summary 
judgment was inappropriate. Given this evidence, Credit 
Alliance's proffered legitimate reason for discharging Keller 
simply creates a material issue of fact, rather than 
demonstrating the absence of one. 
 II. PRETEXT UNDER MCDONNELL DOUGLAS-BURDINE  
 
Since the majority assumes that Keller has presented a 
prima facie case, I will next address whether the evidence 
presented is sufficient to survive summary judgment under 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
A. Evidence Supporting An Inference of Discrimination 
 
Under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework, I 
believe Keller has offered sufficient evidence which could 
support a finding that Credit Alliance's proffered 
explanation is pretext and therefore creates a material issue 
of fact as to the credibility of that explanation. 
 
1. Evidence of Discrimination 
 
We have consistently held that a plaintiff who has made 
out a prima facie case can defeat a motion for summary 
judgment by "adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or 
direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a 
motivating or determinative cause of the adverse 
employment action." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. Evidence of 
age-based comments made by a supervisor, therefore, could 
support an inference that the termination decision was 
made because of the plaintiff's age. Abrams, 50 F.3d at 
1214; Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 834 (3d Cir. 1994); 
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Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
       Indeed, we have held that discriminatory comments by 
       nondecisionmakers, or statements temporally remote 
       from the decision at issue, may properly be used to 
       build a circumstantial case of discrimination. [See] 
       Roebuck v. Drexel University, 852 F.2d 715, 733 (3d 
       Cir. 1988) (upholding admissibility of discriminatory 
       comment by decisionmaker made five years before 
       denial of tenure). 
 
Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1214 (citation omitted). When combined 
with Keller's prima facie case, Ryan's suggestion that 
perhaps Keller was getting "too old" for the job, and that he 
should hire some "young bankers" could clearly support an 
inference of discrimination. 
 
This conclusion is supported by our prior decisions. In 
Roebuck, we concluded that the comment that "in terms of 
comparable white faculty members . . . blacks would cost 
Drexel more money to hire those black faculty members," 
could give rise to an inference of discrimination even when 
made five years before the decision in question. 852 F.2d at 
733. Similarly, in Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., we found 
that when combined with the plaintiff 's prima facie case, a 
comment that he should lose some weight because it would 
make him healthier and look younger, made five months 
before the termination, could support the conclusion that 
age was more likely than not a determinative factor. 56 
F.3d 491, 502 (3d Cir. 1995). Likewise, an inference of 
discrimination was evident in Abrams, given comments like 
"things would hum around here when we got rid of the old 
fogies," and the fact that two older employees were referred 
to as "a dinosaur" and "the old men." 50 F.3d at 1214. 
Finally, in Torre, we found that the statement "did you 
forget or are you getting too old, you senile bastard?" could 
reasonably lead to an inference of age-based discrimination. 
42 F.3d at 834. See also Robinson, 23 F.3d at 1165; 
Shager, 913 F.2d at 402-03. 
 
I must note that the fact Keller was replaced by an 
individual roughly five years his junior should not and does 
not impair Keller's ability to maintain a claim under the 
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ADEA. Whether the age gap is five years or twenty-five 
years is irrelevant. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin 
Caterers Corporation, 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996) (holding 
that a plaintiff need not be replaced by someone outside the 
protected class to maintain a claim under the ADEA). The 
district court thus erred in holding that Keller had to 
present evidence that he was "replaced by someone 
significantly younger to permit an inference of age 
discrimination." Majority Opinion at 12 (quoting District 
Court Opinion at 8). I recognize that the majority's opinion 
does not affirm this particular holding of the district court, 
but I am troubled that it also does not explicitly disavow 
the holding. Because of the importance of this point, and 
for purposes of clarity in future cases, the inclusion of such 
a disclaimer in the majority's opinion would have been 
appropriate, as I will explain below. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that there is no particular 
age difference that must be shown to maintain a claim of 
age discrimination. See O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310; see 
also Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729 (3d 
Cir. 1995). In other words, "[t]here is no magical formula to 
measure a particular age gap and determine if it is 
sufficiently wide to give rise to an inference of 
discrimination." Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., 68 F.3d 
694, 699 (3d Cir. 1995). As we have noted, "[d]ifferent 
courts have held, for instance, that a five year difference 
can be sufficient but that a one year difference cannot." 
Sempier, 45 F.3d at 729 (citing Douglas v. Anderson, 656 
F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981) and Gray v. York 
Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1087 (3d Cir. 1992)). See 
also Corbin v. Southland Int'l Trucks, 25 F.3d 1545, 1550 
(11th Cir. 1994) (finding evidence of pretext when a 53 
year-old was treated more favorably than a 58 year-old 
employee). In order to survive summary judgment, the 
evidence need only provide a basis for a reasonable 
factfinder to conclude that a discriminatory animus was at 
play in the employer's decision. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 
1310. Accordingly, the "replacement by even an older 
employee will not necessarily foreclose . . . proof if other 
direct or circumstantial evidence supports an inference of 
discrimination." Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 
(9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). In fact, the Tenth Circuit, 
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in Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 557 (10th 
Cir. 1996), reversed a grant of summary judgment as to an 
ADEA claim even though the replacement was five years 
older than the plaintiff. 
 
Beyond the context of age discrimination, other courts of 
appeal have been cognizant of the fact that an employer 
can act with a discriminatory animus even when replacing 
a discharged employee with a member of the same 
protected class. In Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 8 
F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1996), the district court had concluded 
that the fact that Carson, who was white, was replaced by 
a white employee prevented her from establishing a prima 
facie case of discrimination. The court of appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit rejected this conclusion, observing that, 
 
       [The Supreme Court's opinion in] O'Connor v. 
       Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. 
       Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1966), shows that this 
       understanding of a prima facie case is erroneous. The 
       Court held in O'Connor that the plaintiff in an age 
       discrimination suit need not show that he was replaced 
       by a person outside the protected class. Laws against 
       discrimination protect persons, not classes, the Court 
       remarked, an observation with equal force in a case 
       under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 
Id. at 158. 
 
The court then illustrated the point with the following 
hypothetical: 
 
       Suppose an employer evaluates its staff yearly and 
       retains black workers who are in the top quarter of its 
       labor force, but keeps any white in the top half. A 
       black employee ranked in the 60th percentile of the 
       staff according to supervisors' evaluations is let go, 
       while all white employees similarly situated are 
       retained. This is race discrimination, which the 
       employer cannot purge by hiring another person of the 
       same race later. 
 
Id. 
 
In the same vein, another court has noted that 
replacement with a protected class member does not negate 
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a discriminatory animus if the employer is "less tolerant of 
indiscretions committed by black employees than of those 
committed by whites." Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall 
Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1186 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company, 
427 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976)). Significantly, the Nix court 
also noted that replacement with another member of the 
same class may serve as "a pretextual device, specifically 
designed by [the employer] to disguise its act of 
discrimination toward [the discharged employee.]" 738 F.2d 
at 1186 n.1 (quoting Jones v. Western Geophysical Co. Of 
America, 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982)). In fact, in the 
racial context, replacement with another member of the 
protected class often enables an employer to mask 
discriminatory motives while realizing racist ideals and 
stereotypes. The replacement of darker-skinned black 
employees with lighter-skinned black employees occurs 
every day in this country in the hope of making white co- 
workers and customers more "comfortable." Similarly, we 
all know that the replacement of one woman with another 
who more closely resembles a traditional conception of the 
so-called "feminine ideal," in terms of physical appearance, 
demeanor, (lack of) assertiveness, etc., is not some abstract 
theory; it is reality, and it happens every day, in business, 
in the media, and even in our esteemed profession. 
 
In all of these cases, a discriminatory animus can be 
present even though the replacement is of the same 
protected class as the discharged employee. The majority 
declines to acknowledge that a replacement's "race, sex, or 
age may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but it 
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition." Carson, 
82 F.3d at 159 (citations omitted); see also Nieto v. L&H 
Packing Company, 108 F.3d 621, 624 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(fact that Hispanic employee's replacement was also 
Hispanic does not preclude "possibility that the discharge 
was motivated [by] discriminatory reasons"); Monette v. 
Electronic Data Systems Corporation, 90 F.3d 1173, 1185 
n.11 (6th Cir. 1996) (disabled employee need not show 
replacement is non-disabled to present prima facie case of 
discrimination). But as the Supreme Court has emphasized, 
"[t]he fact that one person in the protected class has lost 
out to another person in the protected class is . . . 
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irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of[an illegal 
criterion]." O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310. An employer does 
not have "license to discriminate against some employees 
on the basis of race or sex [or age] merely because he 
favorably treats other members of the employees' group." 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455 (1982). 
 
We have already recognized instances of age 
discrimination in the absence of a considerable age gap 
between the discharged employee and the replacement. In 
Sempier, for example, we found that the plaintiff had 
presented evidence from which a factfinder could 
"reasonably conclude that [an] employment decision was 
made on the basis of age" even though the replacement was 
only four years younger. 45 F.3d at 729. Without deciding 
whether four years alone was enough, we concluded that 
the four year difference, combined with the fact that the 
plaintiff 's functions were also temporarily transferred to 
someone well over ten years younger, were sufficient to 
support an inference of age discrimination. Id. at 730. 
 
I believe that the approximate five year age difference 
between Keller and his replacement, particularly when 
combined with Ryan's age-based comment, is sufficient to 
establish an inference that Keller's age was a motivating 
factor in Credit Alliance's decision. Given Keller's 
experience, and the fact that the age difference spans 
chronological decades, so to speak (Keller was in his "fifties" 
while his replacement was in his "forties"), a factfinder 
could reasonably conclude age was a determinative factor 
in the decision to fire Keller. See Pace v. Southern Ry. 
System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1387 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Seldom will 
a sixty year-old be replaced by a person in the twenties. 
Rather the sixty-year-old will be replaced by a fifty-five 
year-old, who, in turn, is succeeded by someone in the 
forties, who also will be replaced by a younger person."). 
The precise gap in age between Keller and his replacement 
is less relevant than the overall impression presented by 
the evidence that Credit Alliance used age as a 
determinative factor in making its decision. See O'Connor, 
116 S. Ct. at 1310 (stating "irrelevant factor[s]" should not 
take precedence over "evidence adequate to create an 
inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] 
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[illegal] discriminatory criterion"). Since Keller produced 
evidence which could support the conclusion that age was 
more likely than not a motivating factor in Ryan's decision 
to terminate him, Credit Alliance's proffered reason merely 
creates a material issue of fact. 
 
In sum, while I agree with the majority that the 
narrowness of the age gap between Keller and his 
replacement is a factor a reasonable factfinder would have 
to consider, I do not agree that "the gap" does not permit a 
reasonable inference of discrimination. 
 
2. Evidence That the Employer's Proffered Reason Is Not 
   Worthy Of Credence 
 
A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case may 
also defeat a motion for summary judgment by presenting 
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude 
that the defendant's proffered justifications are not worthy 
of credence. Torre, 42 F.3d at 832; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 
(legal principle reaffirmed in Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc)). Credit Alliance's proffered reason for terminating 
Keller was his failure to make adequate progress toward 
achieving their financing goal. Credit Alliance argues, and 
the majority concludes, that Keller's evidence is aimed at 
simply demonstrating that this decision was wrong 
because, according to Keller, it was impossible to reach the 
goal. Majority Opinion at 15-17. This conclusion 
misinterprets both the evidence and Keller's argument. 
 
Keller is not arguing that the proffered reason is 
pretextual because it is wrong. He is arguing that Credit 
Alliance was aware of the outside factors that hindered his 
ability to obtain funding, and that they did not fault him for 
the results of his efforts. 
 
While pretext is not demonstrated by showing that the 
employer was mistaken, Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and 
Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1993), it can be 
established by "evidence of inconsistencies or anomalies 
that could support an inference that the employer did not 
act for its stated reason." Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731 (citing 
Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d 
Cir. 1993)) (emphasis added). The thrust of the evidence 
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and Keller's argument is that Credit Alliance was not 
dissatisfied with his performance, because it knew that 
efforts to obtain outside fundraising were impeded by 
various market forces. 
 
Keller relies upon evidence which could establish: (1) that 
Credit Alliance's disappointing progress was due to forces 
beyond his control; (2) that Credit Alliance recognized that 
fact; and (3) that it knew that this poor showing was not 
attributable to him. Seen in the light most favorable to 
Keller, I think it is clear that a reasonable jury could 
consider Credit Alliance's explanation that Keller was fired 
for "poor performance" pretextual. See Sorba v. 
Pennsylvania Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(reversing summary judgment when the plaintiff proffered 
evidence "that his supervisors realized that the poor results 
were not his fault [and that the] testimony of the movant's 
witnesses was inconsistent regarding whether they believed 
[plaintiff]'s performance caused the unsatisfactory job 
results"). See also Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 
989, 996 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that there was 
sufficient evidence to support a finding of discrimination 
when the plaintiff demonstrated that the employer's 
proffered explanation of poor performance was pretextual 
because his poor results were due to the company's prices 
and a poor customer base); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, 
Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cir. 1993) (report stating that 
morale problems caused by other factors created factual 
issue regarding plaintiff 's performance); Mastrangelo v. 
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 722 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (finding sufficient evidence showing defendant's 
criticism of plaintiff 's performance was pretextual where 
problems of his department were attributable, at least in 
part, to matters beyond his control). 
 
Furthermore, unlike the majority, I believe the absence of 
any criticism of Keller's performance would permit a 
reasonable factfinder to disbelieve Credit Alliance's 
proffered explanation. The majority unnecessarily 
complicates the analysis by requiring Keller to show that 
"other comparable employees" received evaluations of their 
work. Majority Opinion at 19. Regardless of Credit 
Alliance's general evaluative practices, I find it difficult to 
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conceive of an employee's work being so inadequate as to 
warrant termination but not so poor as to warrant some 
criticism before the point of termination. Indeed, we have 
generally confined our analysis to an employer's evaluation 
of the discharged employee, not an employer's general 
practice of assessing employee performance. In Sempier, for 
example, we concluded that a genuine issue existed as to 
pretext because of the plaintiff 's own testimony of 
satisfactory performance combined with evidence that he 
was not criticized while still employed. 45 F.3d at 731-32. 
 
To justify firing Keller, the only evidence offered by Credit 
Alliance is the post-hoc deposition testimony of some of the 
members of the board of directors who ratified the decision 
to fire Keller. With the exception of Ryan's testimony and a 
purported comment made after Ryan decided to fire Keller, 
much of the evidence is ambiguous as to whether the 
statement represented criticism. For the most part, Credit 
Alliance asks us to infer that questions about the progress 
of the fundraising were criticisms of Keller's performance. 
For example, Credit Alliance points to the fact that one of 
its outside directors suggested that Keller be relieved of his 
duties as Chief Credit Officer so he could concentrate on 
raising funds, and asks that we consider this suggestion a 
"criticism" of Keller's performance. However, we cannot 
draw such an unwarranted inference at the summary 
judgment phase, particularly in view of the fact that Keller 
offered evidence that when questioned about the progress, 
the board accepted his explanation that difficulties in the 
U.S. and Japanese economies made it difficult to secure 
funding on terms more favorable than the terms provided 
by their current source. 
 
Finally, the majority improperly relies on events which 
occurred after Keller was fired. The majority suggests that 
Credit Alliance's ability to raise nearly $500 million using 
asset-backed securitization, the technique eschewed by 
Keller, indicates that its dissatisfaction with Keller's work 
was sincere. Majority Opinion at 16-17. However, this tactic 
did not prove successful until after Keller's discharge so it 
should not have any bearing on the determination of 
whether Credit Alliance acted with a discriminatory 
animus. "The employer could not have been motivated by 
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knowledge it did not have, and [therefore] it cannot . . . 
claim that the employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory 
reason." McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 
U.S. 352, 360 (1995). 
 
It is also true that Keller's performance subsequent to 
Ryan's decision to terminate him is relevant for establishing 
pretext. Ryan testified that if Keller had come up with a 
plan and demonstrated some success in achieving it, he 
(Ryan) might have changed his mind. Keller provided 
evidence to demonstrate that he had done the preliminary 
work on some, if not all, of the means of financing that 
later proved to be successful. In particular, Keller points to 
evidence that he formulated a plan to achieve Credit 
Alliance's financing goal. In deposition testimony, Ryan 
admitted that the steps outlined in the plan provided by 
Keller were the ones followed by Credit Alliance in 
successfully raising funds in 1993 and 1994. Also, Keller 
successfully secured the $100 million private placement 
that was the first step in improving Credit Alliance's credit 
rating. Despite Keller's plan and demonstration of success, 
however, Ryan terminated him. A jury could conclude that 
Keller played a significant role in Credit Alliance's 
subsequent attainment of its funding goal, and that Credit 
Alliance's claim of poor performance, therefore, was 
pretextual. 
 
Given this evidence, there is a material issue of fact as to 
whether Credit Alliance recognized the economic problems 
associated with the fundraising and therefore whether 
Keller's performance was the reason for his discharge. 
If a factfinder were to accept Keller's evidence and 
interpretation of that evidence, it could reasonably conclude 
that Credit Alliance did not in fact fire him based upon any 
dissatisfaction with his ability to raise financing. The 
factfinder could then further conclude that Keller was 
terminated because of his age. Fuentes, 32 F.3d 759, 764. 
As material issues of fact remain in dispute, summary 
judgment in favor of Credit Alliance is inappropriate. 
 
III. FAILURE TO PROMOTE 
 
Credit Alliance argues that Keller has not demonstrated 
that he was qualified for the position of Chief Operating 
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Officer, did not apply for the position, and that he is 
estopped from asserting a discrimination claim because as 
a member of the board of directors he voted for Copper's 
appointment. I believe that there is sufficient evidence in 
the record for Keller's failure to promote claim to survive 
summary judgment. First, Keller clearly established that he 
was qualified for the position of Chief Operating Officer. In 
reviewing qualifications, we must only look to objective 
criteria, such as Keller's education and experience. See 
Weldon, 896 F.2d at 798. Second, Keller correctly argues 
that he was not required to apply for the position. See 
Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 
1133 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding plaintiff can maintain claim 
of discrimination, without having applied for job, if 
employer "had some reason or duty to consider him for the 
post"). Keller's senior management position, his prior 
consideration for the position of President of Credit 
Alliance, and Ryan's knowledge that Keller was interested 
in the Chief Operating Officer position are sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case as to this claim. 
 
I do not believe that Credit Alliance's proffered 
justification for refusing to consider or promote Keller 
entitles it to summary judgment. According to Ryan, the 
position of Chief Operating Officer required line experience 
and a thorough understanding of the company's business, 
which he claims Keller lacked. Yet, as discussed above, 
Ryan's alleged statement that Keller may be too old to do 
his job, made only weeks before the promotion decision, is 
evidence from which a jury could infer discrimination. 
Furthermore, Keller points to evidence from the Chair of 
Credit Alliance's predecessor company that he did, in fact, 
have a thorough understanding of the business and was 
considered a candidate for president of the company at the 
time Ryan was ultimately selected. In light of this evidence, 
a factfinder could conclude that Credit Alliance's claim that 
Keller was not qualified is pretextual. Consequently, there 
is sufficient direct, as well as indirect, evidence from which 
a factfinder could also conclude that Keller was not 
promoted because of his age. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To summarize, I believe that there is sufficient direct and 
indirect evidence of discrimination for Keller's ADEA and 
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NJLAD claims to survive summary judgment. I would, 
accordingly, reverse the district court's judgment in its 
entirety and remand for further proceedings. 
 
Joined by Judges Mansmann and McKee. 
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